In a symmetric independent private values setting a sealed-bid double auction dissolves a partnership e¢ciently. This well known result remains valid in a model with interdependent valuations. However, if the interdependent components of valuations are large agents might prefer not to participate in a double auction. Therefore a simple extention of the rules of double-auctions is suggested that ensures participation. Even though these modi…ed double auctions are not incentive e¢cient, they still realize gains from trade and can be implemented without knowledge about the model's speci…cations.
Introduction
When two (or more) partners own a …rm together and want to dissolve the partnership they face the problem of choosing a "good" way to do so. A common situation is one where di¤erent partners are responsible for di¤erent parts or departments of their …rm. It is natural to assume that they gain di¤erent information that helps them valuing their partnership as a whole. A dissolution mechanism therefore has to take into account the fact that at the end of a partnership each of the partners might neither know the other partner's valuation nor her own valuation for the entire …rm. The latter is due to the fact that a partner's valuation for the entire …rm also depends on private information of the other partner who has gained more accurate information about the part of the …rm she was supervising. Obviously no partner is willing to reveal her information for free because this may lead to disadvantages in negotiations about the conditions of the dissolution. Therefore agents have to be paid an informational rent to reveal their information truthfully. If the agents are not subsidized by a third party these rents have to be generated by the trading possibilities due to di¤erences in valuations. An important question in this context is whether the partnership can be dissolved e¢ciently, i.e. whether a trading mechanism exists that allocates the entire partnership to the partner who (ex-post) values it most. In a su¢ciently symmetric setting with independent private values an ex-post e¢cient dissolution can be achieved by a simple mechanism, the so called k¡double auction 1 . In the k¡double auction the partners each submit a sealed bid and the entire partnership is allocated to the partner with the highest bid. The highest bidder's payment to the other partners is a convex combination of the highest bid (b H ) and second highest bid (b L ), i.e. the payment for the entire partnership is given by kb L +(1 ¡ k) b H where k 2 [0; 1]. Since the rules of the k¡double auction are independent of the valuation structure 2 , a mechanism designer does not need to know the details of a given trading situation in order to implement this mechanism. Furthermore the k¡double auction is ex-post budget-balanced which means that it never has to be subsidized by the mechanism designer. This suggests that the k¡double auction is a favorable dissolution mechanism in an independent private values framework. In particular it is better than a Clark-Groves-Vickrey mechanism (which is not ex-post budget balanced) or a widely used shoot-out mechanism in which one side submits an o¤er and the other side has the choice of either buying or selling at the o¤ered price. Note that because the partner who makes the initial o¤er will (in general) not bid her true valuation, the shoot-out mechanism is not ex-post e¢cient.
In this paper I concentrate on the case of an equal partnership with two partners and a symmetric valuation structure. In contrast to most of the existing literature, I allow for interdependent valuations. In my model the agents' valuations depend on own private information and on private information available to the other agent. Therefore the agents' valuations are correlated 3 . I restrict attention to the case of a positive correlation between agents' valuations. This structure of the valuations does (in contrast to an independent private values model) take into account that both partners might have gathered private insight in the …rm which determines the valuations of both partners.
I show that there exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies of the k¡double auction. This equilibrium is symmetric and results in an e¢cient allocation. An important di¤erence compared to an independent private values model is that agents no longer have the opportunity to ensure themselves a positive payo¤ by participating in the k¡double auction. This is due to the fact that agents do not know their valuations on the interim stage. Therefore they do not have a rescue strategy, as in the private values case, where submitting the valuation always guarantees a positive payo¤ 4 . I show that in environments where no budget-balanced, individually rational and incentive compatible 1 A double auction is ex-post e¢cient in a su¢ciently symmetric setting with independent private values in case of risk neutral partners (see Cramton et al. [1987] ) or partners with CARA-utility functions (see McAfee [1992] ).
2 i.e. independent of valuation functions and distributions of types 3 The agent's information is assumed to be independently distributed. 4 Note that bidding her own valuation can never be unpro…table for a partner since she sells her share only if payments exceed her valuation and buys the other agent's share only if payments are below her valuation.
2 mechanism that dissolves the partnership in an ex-post e¢cient way exists, the e¢cient equilibrium of the k¡double auction is not individually rational. The intuition behind this shortcoming of the k¡double auction is given by the fact that a bidder has to take into account a winner's and a looser's curse. If a partner wins the double auction this is "bad news" for her since this indicates that her partner's and therefore her own valuation are likely to be low. On the other hand, if she looses this again is "bad news" since this suggests that her partner's information indicates a high value of the …rm. If we cannot force agents to participate, the rules of the k¡double auction have to be extended in a way such that voluntary participation is guaranteed. This is done by allowing for nonparticipating or vetoing against the dissolution: If at least one agent vetoes or does not participate, the mechanism designer (auctioneer) implements the initial allocation of the partnership thus creating ine¢ciencies. However the k¡double auction with the opportunity to veto results in an ex-post e¢cient allocation whenever it is possible to dissolve the partnership e¢ciently in general, i.e. whenever an ex-post e¢cient, individually rational, budget-balanced and incentive compatible dissolution mechanism exists. Given further assumptions on the valuation functions, I show that the possibility to veto guarantees that there always exist equilibria that still realize gains from trade. It turns out that partners who expect to have an average valuation for the partnership prefer to veto in the auction. Their chances of becoming buyer or seller are almost the same whereby trading opportunities are worse than for partners with either high valuation (who mainly buy) or low valuation (who primarily sell).
The model of this paper is based on Cramton et al. [1987] and generalizes their setting to interdependent valuations. In McAfee [1992] special k¡double auctions are compared to other simple dissolution mechanisms for the equal partnership case. Even though McAfee allows for CARA-utility functions, both papers restrict attention to an independent private values framework. Keeping the independent private values framework and assuming equal distribution of the partnership, de Frutos [2000] compares e¢ciency and revenue of the k¡double auction for k = 0; 1 if valuations are distributed asymmetrically. In addition to the literature that derives properties of double auctions for the equal partnership there exists a vast literature on k¡double auctions in the case of a buyer and a seller (which can be seen as an extreme case of a partnership where property rights belong to one agent, the seller). Leininger et al. [1989] and Satterthwaite and Williams [1989] show that in the buyer/seller setting k¡double auctions possess a continuum of pure strategy equilibria 5 if k 2 (0; 1) : These can be ranked from equilibria that realize no gains from trade to equilibria that are incentive e¢cient 6 . Note that the uniqueness result for equilibria in this paper shows that multiplicity of equilibria is not necessarily present in k¡double auctions, even if k 2 (0; 1). Bulow et al. [1999] analyze special cases of the k¡double auction in a common values model and uniform distribution of types. They analyze the e¤ects of an unequal distribution of ownership rights on bidders advantages in a …rst-price (k = 0) or second price (k = 1) double auction. In addition they show the general uniqueness of the equilibrium of double auctions if k = 0 or k = 1 in their common value model. Note that in this paper I show uniqueness of equilibria for all k¡double auctions. EngelbrechtWiggans [1994] computes equilibria of a …rst-and second-price double auction in a model with a¢liated values.
Neglecting the problem of …nancing the agents' informational rents, Jehiel and Moldovanu [1999] show that as long as agents' private information is one-dimensional, an e¢-cient mechanism to dissolve the partnership can always be found 7 . They also show that a re…nement of the Clarke-Groves-Vickrey approach can be used to get an e¢cient and incentive compatible direct mechanism (this re…nement has also been done in Dasgupta and Maskin [1999] ). In Fieseler at al. [2000] this mechanism is used to analyze whether in a partnership model with interdependent valuations there exist mechanisms that are (ex-post) e¢cient, incentive compatible, individually rational and budget balanced. They show that in contrast to a private values setting, it might be impossible to …nd a distribution of ownership rights such that the partnership can be dissolved e¢ciently, i.e. by an e¢cient, incentive compatible individually rational and budget balanced mechanism. In particular they show that it might not be possible to dissolve the equal partnership e¢ciently if the interdependence of valuations is too strong.
This paper is organized as follows: In section 2, I introduce the model of interdependent valuations. In section 3, I generalize the optimality result for symmetric k¡double auctions to environments with interdependent values in which incentive compatible, (ex-post) e¢cient, budget balanced and individually rational mechanisms exist. I also compute the symmetric bidding equilibrium which is the unique equilibrium in pure strategies. In section 4, I analyze those cases of separable valuation functions in which a double auction is not individually rational. By giving each bidder the possibility to veto against a dissolution, individual rationality of the double auction (with veto) is assured. Furthermore this auction is ex-post e¢cient in cases where ex-post e¢cient, budget balanced, individually rational and incentive compatible mechanism exists. I compute the symmetric equilibrium bidding strategies of this auction and show that there always exist a symmetric equilibrium in which gains from trade are realized. In addition I give an example in which the double auction with veto is not the optimal (i.e. incentive e¢cient) mechanism, which it is in the independent private values model. For that example I give an indication of the performance of the double auction with veto. Section 5 is the conclusion. The proofs can be found in the appendix.
The Model
Two risk neutral agents each own an equal share in a partnership. Each agent i has private information represented by a type µ i which in ‡uences her own and her partner's valuation for the partnership. By µ ¡i I denote the type of the agent other than i: Agent i 0 s valuation for the entire partnership is given by v i (µ 1 ; µ 2 ) ; which I assume to be contin-uously di¤erentiable in every argument. I assume (unless otherwise stated) a symmetric environment: the types of the agents are drawn from the same distribution function F; and valuation functions are symmetric:
Note that symmetry assumptions of this type are necessary to directly compute equilibria of the considered auctions and can also be found in Cramton et al. [1987] or McAfee [1992] . The distribution function F is strictly increasing and di¤erentiable with derivative f: The support of f is given by £ µ; µ ¤ ½ R: I further assume that agents' types are independent. The valuation function v i is strictly increasing in µ i and increasing in µ ¡i . I denote the partial derivative of v i with respect to its j'th component with v i;j and I assume that
Note that, because of (1), this is equivalent to v 2;2 > v 1;2 : (2) is a common assumption in interdependent valuation environments. It ensures the existence of e¢cient and incentive compatible mechanisms 8 . Given a realization of types the utility of agent i who owns¯i in the entire partnership and has money m i is quasilinear and given by
Characteristic functions are de…ned as follows:
The k¡Double Auctions
The k-double auction is a Bayesian game where the strategy spaces of the agents are given by the set of functions b : £ µ; µ ¤ 7 ! R: Given her type µ i ; agent i submits a bid b i (µ i ) 2 R: Denote the index of the agent who submits the higher bid by H and the index of the other agent by L: Given the bids b L and b H and the parameter k 2 [0; 1]; the agent with the higher bid gets the entire partnership and pays to the other agent the amount
In case both agents submit the same bid the partnership is given to agent i with probability 1 2 and the "winning bidder" pays 0 (or any other …xed amount) to the other agent. Note that such an auction is always ex-post budget balanced since agent L gets what agent H pays. Assume that agent ¡i bids according to b ¡i (µ ¡i ) : The interim utility of a type µ i agent who bids b i is given by
8 For a discussion of this assumption see Dasgupta and Maskin [1999] or Jehiel and Moldovanu [1999] .
5
The equilibrium concept used is that of pure Bayesian-Nash-Equilibrium (BNE ). A BNE (b 1 (µ 1 ) ; b 2 (µ 2 )) is individually rational if for i = 1; 2
2 we have :
which, because of µ 1 > µ 2 , v 1 (µ 1 ; µ 2 ) > v 2 (µ 1 ; µ 2 ) ; is equivalent to
The next Theorem characterizes the possible outcomes of the k¡double auction. It turns out that there exists a unique BNE (in pure strategies). This equilibrium is symmetric.
For simplicity I use the following notation:
Theorem 1 The k¡double auction has a unique equilibrium bidding strategy in pure strategies given by
Note that this strategy is strictly increasing and therefore the k¡double auction is ex-post e¢cient 9 . In the private values case, i.e. if v i;¡i = 0; i = 1; 2, any BNE of a k-double auction must be individually rational because by bidding exactly her valuation each agent can guarantee herself a positive outcome of the auction regardless of the bid of the other bidder. Independent of k; she never pays more than her valuation for the other agent's share if she wins and if she looses she never gets less than her valuation for the part of the partnership she sells 10 . In general, it is not possible for a partner to bid her true valuation, which depends on private information of the other partner. Therefore a partner might risk to loose her share for a payment that is smaller than her valuation. As shown below, this is exactly what happens if the in ‡uence of the other agent's information on the own valuation is high. The intuition behind this observation is that a bidder faces a winner's and a looser's curse. If she wins she risks to pay too much for the partnership since winning indicates a low partner's type and therefore a low valuation of the partnership. If she looses, this is again "bad news" for her since this indicates a high type of the partner and therefore a high value of the partnership. Since a bidder has to take these winner's and looser's curses into account at the same time, she cannot correct for these in a way that prevents her from making losses.
The following Theorem characterizes environments in which k¡double auctions are not individually rational.
Theorem 2 A k¡double auction is individually rational if and only if there exists an ex-post e¢cient, incentive compatible, individually rational and budget balanced direct revelation mechanism.
An existence condition for ex-post e¢cient, incentive compatible, individually rational and budget balanced mechanisms is given in Fieseler et al. [2000] for the class of separable valuation functions:
Given their result and the above Theorem we get:
Theorem 3 Given valuation functions of the form (5) ; the k¡double auction is individually rational if and only if
Note that this existence condition depends on v and F whereas the k¡double auction is a simple mechanism in a sense that it does not depend on the speci…cations of the agents' valuations and can therefore be applied universally. Nevertheless if partners are able to refuse to participate in a k¡double auction a mechanism designer who is not familiar with these speci…cations does not know whether the partners will participate and how those behave who are participating but expect others not to participate. In the next section I extend the rules of the k¡double auction to obtain a mechanism that is always individually rational, does not depend on speci…cations of the valuation structures and is ex-post e¢cient whenever there exist an ex-post e¢cient, individually rational, budget balanced and incentive compatible mechanism.
Double Auctions with voluntary participation
To ensure that the equilibria of the k¡double auction are individually rational I extend the strategy spaces in such a way that every agent has the right to say "No" (write "No" in the sealed bid). The agents' strategy spaces are given by the set of functions:
The outcome of the game is de…ned as follows: If b 1 =N or b 2 =N then the partnership is not dissolved (or, equivalently, each agent gets the partnership with probability 1 2
). In any other case, the partnership is given to the agent with the higher bid. He pays p = 1 2
to the other agent. I call this Bayesian game the k¡double auction with veto.
Note that the k¡double auction with veto is always individually rational, because every type can veto and therefore assure that she never makes losses by participating in the auction. Furthermore if the k¡double auction (without veto) is individually rational its equilibrium is also an equilibrium of the k¡double auction with veto. It is easy to see that the k¡double auction with veto has at least one further equilibrium which does not realize any gains from trade: always vetoing.
In the following I restrict attention to the more elaborate environments where the k¡double auction is not individually rational. To get a precise characterization of symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria I also restrict the analysis to the case of additively separable valuation functions 11 , i.e. agent i's valuation for the entire partnership is given by the function v i (µ 1 ; µ 2 ) = g (µ i ) + h (µ ¡i ) : I assume g; h to be twice di¤erentiable with g 0 > h 0¸0 : I assume the existence condition in Theorem 3 not to hold, i.e.
I show that apart from the equilibrium where all types veto there exist further symmetric equilibria that realize gains from trade if we choose k = 1 2 : In these equilibria the types close to the boundaries of the support of agents' types want the partnership to be dissolved whereas types around F are the "worst o¤" types in the k¡double auction mechanism, i.e. these types have the lowest interim utility of participating in the k¡double auction. This is due to the fact that these types are (almost) equally likely to be buyer or seller of a share. In each case the expected gains from trade (i.e. the expected di¤erences in agents' valuations) are small compared to types close to the boundaries of the support of types. Therefore the types around F 11 This restriction on the valuation functions is equivalent to requiring that the in ‡uence of the other agent's type on an agent's valuation does not depend on his own type, i.e. 
Then the following bidding strategy constitutes a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the 1 2 ¡double auction with veto:
Instead of directly verifying that a deviation of the given strategy cannot be pro…table if the other agent sticks to it, I use the Revenue-Equivalence-Theorem (Theorem 6, see the Appendix) for an indirect proof. Given an allocation rule s; the Revenue-EquivalenceTheorem determines (up to a type-independent constant) the payments (depending on the agents' reported types) necessary and su¢cient to implement s in a truthtelling equilibrium. By the revelation principle in any (indirect) mechanism that implements s the expected payments to agents in equilibrium have to equal those given by the RevenueEquivalence-Theorem (up to a type independent constant). Furthermore if the expected payments to agents induced by a given strategy-pro…le in an indirect mechanism that implements s equal those given by the Revenue-Equivalence-Theorem we know that imitating the strategy of a di¤erent type cannot be pro…table. Therefore I show that the payments induced by (7) equal those of a direct mechanism that implements the allocation resulting from (7) in truthtelling. In addition I can show that deviating to a bid outside the range of (7) cannot be pro…table which completes the proof.
Instead of vetoing, it is also possible to extend the rules of the k¡double auction such that the agents can choose not to participate in the k¡double auction. In this case the k-double auction is modelled as a two stage game. In the …rst stage each agent decides whether she participates in the 2nd stage or not. If at least one agent decides not to participate in the 2nd stage, the partnership is not dissolved. Otherwise in the 2nd stage a k¡double auction (without veto) is run.
Obviously the concept of a double auction with veto is only meaningful if there exist equilibria that realize gains from trade and therefore do not sustain the status quo like the always vetoing equilibrium. ¡double auction with veto has a symmetric equilibrium where not vetoing occurs with positive probability.
An important feature of the k¡double auction with veto is the independence of its rules of v and F: A mechanism designer can run the auction and she gets the best possible outcome (in terms of e¢ciency) if in general this outcome can be obtained by some budget balanced and individually rational mechanism. If this is not possible, the set of types that do not want to dissolve the partnership is determined by the agents themselves, depending on their knowledge about v and F: As shown in the next section, a mechanism designer who knows v and F might …nd a more e¢cient dissolution mechanism. This re ‡ects the intuition that a mechanism with simple rules that are independent of the speci…cations of the model is unlikely to be always optimal. The mechanism designer might loose e¢ciency if she has not full insight in the trading environment.
An Example for the performance of the double auction with veto
In this section I examine the performance of the symmetric equilibria of the ¡double auction with veto that realizes some gains from trade is given by
where
Playing according to this equilibrium results in an ex-post allocation of the partnership which can be described by the probability that agent 1 gets the entire partnership (depending on the types of the agents). Figure 1 shows the resulting allocation. The performance of this equilibrium is measured by the ex ante gains from trade, i.e. the unweighted sum of the agents' ex-ante utilities. Because of budget balancedness this is given by:
The gains from trade that could be realized if all information were common knowledge is given by Unfortunately it is not known which mechanism performs best in the class of all IR and (ex-ante) budget balanced mechanisms. The general program of constructing the best performing mechanism is given in the appendix. This optimization program suggests that a mechanism might be able to extract more gains from trade if only for type combinations (µ 1 ; µ 2 ) around ¡ 1 2 ; 1 2 ¢ the partnership is not dissolved e¢ciently. Therefore I consider allocation rules as given in Figure 2 . Most gains from trade can be realized if we chose the parameters ± 1 2 [0; ± 2 ] and ± 2 2 [0;
1 2 ] such that 12 ± 1 = ± 2 : A comparison of the performance of this "third best" mechanism (denoted by G T B ) with the 1 2 ¡double auction is given in Table 1 for some parameters a; b. Such mechanisms perform better than the double auction with veto but a mechanism with "simple" rules independent of v i and F 12 These values of ± 1 and ± 2 are chosen such that the inequality condition of the maximization problem given in the appendix (8) is binding. This is the case for ¡double auction could not be obtained. Further calculations show that the mechanisms implementing the allocation given in Figure 2 
Conclusion
The k¡double auction is a favorable mechanism to dissolve a partnership since it has simple rules that do not depend on speci…cations of the agents' valuations. If the interdependent components of the valuation functions are small it can be applied without worrying about agents' participation decisions. Since this is not true any more if the in ‡uence of the other agent's information becomes larger, it might not be possible to successfully run a k¡double auction. This paper suggests a modi…cation of the 1 2 ¡double auction that is individually rational. Symmetric equilibria of this auction are derived and it is shown that even though the mechanism is not always optimal, it succeeds in realizing gains from trade. The rules remain simple and the mechanism designer does not need to know the distribution of types to determine those types not willing to dissolve the partnership. This is done by the participating agents themselves. An exemplarily comparison with another dissolution mechanism shows that (in contrast to the i.p.v. model) the mechanism designer can construct more e¢cient mechanisms if she is familiar with speci…cations of the valuations.
Unfortunately it was not possible to derive the incentive e¢cient mechanism in the model of this paper. This is subject to further research.
Appendix
For simplicity of presentation I need the following notations and de…nitions in this appendix. In a direct revelation mechanisms (DRM) agents report their types, relinquish their share of the good, and then receive a payment t i (µ) and a share s i (µ) of the entire good. A DRM is therefore a game form ¡ = ¡£ µ 1 ; µ 1 ¤ ; £ µ 2 ; µ 2 ¤ ; s; t ¢ , where s (µ) = (s 1 (µ) ; s 2 (µ)) is a vector with components
s 1 (µ) + s 2 (µ) = 1 for all µ; and t (µ) = (t 1 (µ) ; t 2 (µ)) is a vector with components
£ µ j ; µ j ¤ 7 ! R. I call s the allocation rule and t the payments. I refer to the pair (s; t) as a DRM if it is clear which strategy sets £ µ i ; µ i ¤ are meant. A mechanism (s; t) implements the allocation rule s if truth-telling is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the game induced by ¡ and the agents' utility functions. Such a mechanism is called incentive compatible (IC).
The interim utility of agent i given his type µ i and his announcement b µ i (and truthtelling of the other agent) is given by:
I use the following notation:
A DRM is called (ex-ante) budget balanced (BB) if T 1 + T 2 = 0: A DRM is individually rational (IR) if
Performance is measured by realized gains from trade, i.e. by the unweighted sum of the agents' ex-ante utilities. An IC, IR, BB mechanism is called incentive e¢cient if there exists no IC, IR and BB mechanism that performs better. For some proofs I need a generalization of the revenue equivalence theorem to environments with interdependent valuations of the form v i (µ 1 ; µ 2 ) = g (µ i ) + h (µ ¡i ) :
Theorem 6 (Revenue-Equivalence-Theorem) A DRM (s; t) is incentive compatible if and only if the following holds for i = 1; 2:
Proof. The proof is almost identical to the independent private values case.
The general problem an incentive e¢cient mechanism has to solve
Given the model of section 4.1 the general problem an incentive e¢cient mechanism has to solve is given by:
s.t. BB; IR; IC:
13 To get IC we must have for some type e µ i (according to Theorem 6):
Therefore we have (using integration by parts and BB):
The "worst o¤" types, i.e. the types for which the individual rationality constraints are binding, are given by
and we therefore get
This is also su¢cient for being the "worst o¤" type, because IC implies that
For IR to hold we need
The general problem of …nding an incentive e¢cient mechanism can therefore be formulated as 13 :
Given a solution k ¤ 1 of this problem we get k ¤ 2 = 1 ¡ k ¤ 1 and can calculate the according payments t 1 ; t 2 using Theorem 6. Note that the program above is much more complex than in the bilateral trade case, where one agent owns the entire good. In that setting the worst o¤ types do not depend on the allocation and the last condition turns out to be not binding (given certain assumptions on F ).
Proofs Proof of Theorem 1:
In this proof I will denote an equilibrium of the k¡double-auction by (b 1 (µ 1 ) ; b 2 (µ 2 )) where b i (µ i ) denotes the equilibrium bidding strategy of agent i: The agent other than i is denoted by ¡i: Throughout the proof I will assume k 2 (0; 1) : The cases k = 1 and k = 2 are indeed simpler to prove and can be found for a similar model in [1999] .
I summarize the di¤erent steps to illustrate the logic behind the whole proof: In the …rst step I show that the equilibrium has to ful…ll a (symmetric) system of di¤erential equations if it is continuous and strictly increasing. In the 2nd step I show that an equilibrium bidding strategy b i (µ i ) can only be decreasing if there is a gap in b ¡i (µ ¡i ) at µ ¡i = F ¡1 (k) : In step 3 I show that there cannot be atoms (i.e. a positive measure of types submitting the same bid) in the equilibrium bidding functions of both agents at the same bid. In the 4th step I show that the bids of the highest types have to be the same for both bidders and that this is also the case for the bids of the lowest types, i.e.
µ ¢ : I derive conditions that must hold to allow equilibrium bidding functions to have atoms (step 5) or gaps (step 6).
Step 7 and 8 show that the di¤erential equations determine a unique solution if starting from an initial condition
In the 9th step I show that for µ i = F ¡1 (k) we get that b i (µ i ) = v i (µ i ; µ i ) and furthermore that even at µ i = F ¡1 (k) the equilibrium bidding strategies are continuous. Hence the equilibrium bidding strategies are strictly increasing (have no atoms) and are continuous (have no gaps). This shows that the equilibrium has to ful…ll the symmetric system of di¤erential equations derived in step 1 and therefore is symmetric. In the last step (10) I show that it is unique, i.e. only one possible initial condition b i (µ) =b and b i ¡ µ ¢ = b can be ful…lled.
The steps in detail: 
Because b 1 ; b 2 are continuous and strictly increasing and therefore a.e. di¤erentiable on b
H ¢¢ respectively, the same is true for the inverse functions b
Di¤erentiating with respect to b yields the following local …rst order conditions:
Note that this system of di¤erential equations is given for the inverse functions of the equilibrium bidding functions. Since it is Lipschitz-continuous if
uniquely given an "initial condition" on intervals where b ¡1 i are strictly increasing, continuous and
In particular the b i are also uniquely determined on the range of such an interval. If we have b
The proof of this statement follows standard revealed preferences arguments. 16 3. It is impossible that a positive measure of types of agent 1 and 2 submit the same bid, i.e. for all b we have:
If the contrary statement were true, a bidder would prefer to increase or decrease her bid slightly since this would hardly change payments but signi…cantly change her probability of winning or loosing.
4. We have
and
Assume without loss in generality that inf µ b 1 (µ) > inf µ b 2 (µ) (I allow the last value to be ¡1): Then it is pro…table for a type of player 2 who bids below inf µ b 1 (µ) to increase her bid such that she still looses against all types of player 1. Therefore we must have
The monotonicity condition 2. implies that we must have
An analogues argument sows that
We also obtain b 1 (µ) 6 = b 1 ¡ µ ¢ from 2. In addition we know that b 1 (µ) > v 1 (µ; µ). This is because we cannot have an atom at b 1 (µ) in both agents' strategies and therefore if we had b 1 (µ) · v 1 (µ; µ) at least for one agent raising her bid by a small " gains 1 2 k" when she sells (with probability close to one) and loses less then (1 ¡ k) " when she buys (with arbitrarily small probability). A similar reasoning shows that 
This is because a small change in the bid for types bidding close to e b does hardly change payments but signi…cantly changes the probability of winning and losing. Therefore it is pro…table to increase the bid slightly above e b instead of bidding just below e b if the expected value for the partnership is higher than its price, i.e. if
6. I show that if there is a gap between b ¤ and b ¤¤ in the equilibrium bidding function of agent i and we have
then we must have
I assume without loss in generality that
is also a gap in the bidding function of agent ¡i between b ¤ and b ¤¤ since a su¢ciently small increase of a bid within the interval (b ¤ ; b ¤¤ ) of agent ¡i leads to higher expected payments without changing the winning (and loosing) probability. Because of 3. we cannot have atoms at b ¤ in the equilibrium bidding strategies of both players. Therefore if we had (1 ¡ k) Pr µ ¡i fb ¡i (µ ¡i ) · b ¤ g < k Pr µ ¡i fb ¡i (µ ¡i )¸b ¤¤ g at least one player could gain by increasing her bid from b ¤ to just below b ¤¤ since this leads to higher expected payments without changing the winning (and loosing) probability. Similar arguments show that if we have
7. This part shows that starting from an initial bid b 1 (µ) =b > v i (µ; µ) ; it is possible to uniquely continue the solution of the di¤erential equation (9) by increasing µ til
If this were not the case we could …nd µ " arbitrarily close to µ ¤ with
Note that we cannot have a gap after 15 b · b i (µ " ) :In addition we cannot have atoms in the equilibrium bidding functions at b 2
Since there are no gaps in the bidding function of ¡j after or before e b we have (because of 5.) for e µ ¡j = b ¡1 ¡j ³ e b´· µ " that
Since we have
; e µ ¡j´> e b: Therefore if µ " is chosen arbitrarily close to µ ¤ (which is possible) we have µ
On the other hand we have e µ ¡j < F ¡1 (k)
hence type µ U of agent j wins with a probability smaller k and looses with a probability greater k and can therefore improve by raising her bid from e b < v j ³ µ U j ; e µ ¡j( and winning against types close to e µ ¡j where winning is pro…table because of e b < v j ³ µ U j ; e µ ¡j´) . Since there are neither gaps nor atoms equilibrium in
(9) prescribes a symmetric solution 16 for µ 2 (µ ¤ ; µ " ) which is a contradiction to the de…nition of µ ¤ and this part of the proof is complete. Since b 1 ; b 2 can have neither gaps nor atoms in this range (because of 3. and 6.) and are strictly increasing (because of 2.) the same holds for b 
if we decrease the type µ i ; b 1 and b 2 are uniquely determined by (9) (and therefore symmetric) as long as
8. If we can exclude for equilibrium bidding strategies
we have shown that any equilibrium is given by b 1 (µ) and b 1 ¡ µ ¢ and the di¤erentiable solution of (9) for µ 1 6 = F ¡1 (k). Assume without loss in generality that
Arguments similar to those used in 7. show that there are neither gaps nor atoms in a small environment around b i (µ ¤ i ) which implies that (9) is valid: Even though its solution is not necessarily unique any more (because b i (µ
we can deduce from (9) that at least for µ i > µ ¤ i 14 Note that because of 2. bidding strategies cannot decrease in a neighborhood of µ ¤ . 15 If we had a gap one of the bidders could improve by increasing her bid from b into the gap. 16 In fact (9) is a di¤erential equation b 19 and close to µ ¤ i the derivatives of b i (µ i ) are decreasing which is in contrast to 2. and therefore not possible. Again a similar argument shows that we cannot have
9. From the previous steps we know that any equilibrium (b 1 ; b 2 ) has to be symmetric, strictly increasing and must be a solution of the symmetric system of di¤erential equations given by (9). Furthermore an equilibrium is uniquely determined by (9) and the initial conditions µ= b 
Therefore any equilibrium must also be a solution of the following di¤erential equation, which is directly derived from (9) by using the symmetry property of the equilibrium:
This is a linear di¤erential equation and it is easy to verify that its solutions for µ 6 = F ¡1 (k) must have the following form:
Since for any equilibrium we have b (
we must have c = F ¡1 (k) and therefore the only possible candidate for an equilibrium is given by 4. Checking the second order condition (which can be done by straight forward calculations) reveals that (b 1 (µ) ; b 2 (µ)) with b 1 (µ) = b 2 (µ) = b (µ) according to (4) indeed constitutes an equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Because of Theorem 6 we know that the agents' interim utilities by participation in a mechanism that implements the e¢cient allocation of the partnership must have the following representations, where
do not depend on payments 17 : 
Proof of Theorem 4:
Instead of directly verifying that a deviation of the given strategy cannot be pro…table if the other agent sticks to it, I use the Revenue-Equivalence-Theorem (Theorem 6) for an indirect proof. Given an allocation rule s; the Revenue-Equivalence-Theorem determines (up to a type-independent constant) the payments (depending on the agents' reported types) necessary and su¢cient to implement s in a truthtelling equilibrium. By the revelation principle in any (indirect) mechanism that implements s the expected payments to agents in equilibrium have to equal those given by the Revenue-Equivalence-Theorem (up to a type independent constant). Furthermore if the expected payments to agents induced by a candidate of an equilibrium (i.e. (7)) of an indirect mechanism that implements s equal those given by the Revenue-Equivalence-Theorem we know that imitating the strategy of a di¤erent type cannot be pro…table. Therefore I have to show that the payments induced by the given strategies of the double-auction with veto equal those of a direct mechanism that implements the same allocation as the suggested equilibrium strategies. If in addition I can show that deviating to a bid outside the range of (7) cannot be pro…table these have to constitute an equilibrium.
I split the proof in four steps:
1. I show that the condition
is necessary for the induced allocation to result from equilibrium bidding behavior.
2. For general c; d 2 [µ,µ] with F (c) + F (d) = 1 I calculate the expected payments of a direct mechanism that implements the allocation that would result from bidding according to (7).
3. For general c; d 2 [µ,µ] with F (c) + F (d) = 1 I calculate the expected payments induced by (7) and show that these equal the payments derived in step 3. if (and only if) (6) holds.
4. I show that no type has an incentive to bid outside the range of b (µ i ) de…ned by (7).
Step 1: If the agents would bid according to (7) this would result in the following allocation:
Because of the Revenue-Equivalence-Theorem this allocation can only be implemented if
is increasing in µ i: This is the case i¤
Which means that F (c) + F (d) = 1 .
Step 2: Because of step 1 and Theorem 6 (s; t) is IC i¤ we have for an arbitrary type e µ i :
Note that this implies that all agents of type µ i 2 [c; d] must get the same interim utility, which we denote by K. Because of
Step 3: We have to check whether the expected payments induced by bidding according to b i (µ i ) de…ned by (7) equal those derived in the previous step. If this is the case we know that no agent can pro…t by deviating to another bid in the range of the given bidding function or by vetoing in case he has not vetoed before. 
In a next step I show that the expected payments to the agents equal those derived in step 2. For µ i 2 [c; d] this is obviously the case i¤ K = 0. Consider …rst the case µ i 2 [µ; c): Given the rules of the auction we have:
Integration by parts and using the fact that
gives: 
Similar calculations reveal that the expected payments a player of type µ i 2 (d; µ] can expect by participating in the auction equals the expected payments given by (12) under the same condition. Therefore the expected payments in the double auction with veto equal those derived in the previous step i¤ (13) holds which is equivalent to (6).
Step 5: It remains to show that no type has an incentive to change his bid to a number out of the set: (g (t) + h (t)) (F (t) ¡ 1 + F (c)) f (t) dt
As a next step I calculate the value of
Because I assumed the existence condition in Theorem 3 not to hold we have
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